Rönesans ve ardında Aydınlanma dönemiyle beraber gerçekleşen bilimsel ilerlemeler fazlaca dikkat çekmeyi başarmıştır. Bunun sonucunda modern bilim, bilginin en güvenilir kaynağı olarak kabul edilerek onun her meseleyi çözebileceği bir zemine oturtturulmuştur. Öyle ki bilim, Tanrı’nın var olup olmadığına dair de bilgi üretebileceği dillendirilmiştir. Bu aşamada ideolojik yaklaşımların ve din adına sergilenen bazı temelsiz akıl dışı argümanların katkısıyla da bilim artık kutsal bir müesseseye dönüştürülmüştür. Kutsala dönüştürülen bilim, bir diğer kutsal olan dinle artık ortak bir zeminde buluşamayacak hale dönüşmüş ve yanlış (...) bir dikotomiye alet edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla artık ilerleyen bilim, yavaş yavaş “Tanrı’yı yok etmeye” başlamıştır. Artık bu hale dönüşen bilim anlayışı ateistlerin de en büyük destek noktaları olmuştur. Kutsala dönüşen bu bilim anlayışı her ne kadar temelde Hıristiyanlık inancına karşıt olarak ortaya çıkmış olsa da yer yer tüm inançlara yansıtılmaya çalışılmıştır. Oysaki bilimden, “bilimin ilerlemesiyle Tanrı’nın yok olacağına” dair veri sunmasını beklemek aslında bilimin sınırlarından bihaber olmayı gerekli kılmaktadır. Bilimin ilerlemesiyle inancın yok olacağı söylemi, İslam dini açısından kabul edilebilir bir argüman olarak görülmemektedir. Çünkü İslam, aklı dinamik olarak tasvir etmekte ve tabiatı Tanrı’nın varlığının delili olarak sunmaktadır. Diğer taraftan bilimin ilerlemesiyle Tanrı’ya yer kalmayacağını iddia edenlerin unutmaması gereken önemli husus, dinin/imanın bir bilgi eksikliği olmadığı aksine bilginin insanı tasdiğe yönelttiği gerçeğidir. Ayrıca Müslümanların bilimde geri kalmalarının sebebini onların inançlarına bağlayanlar, bunu siyasi, sosyal ve ekonomik bazı sebeplerde araması gerekmektedir. (shrink)

Consensus conferences, also known as citizens’ panels—a collection of lay citizens akin to a jury but charged with deliberating on policy issues with a high technical content—are a potentially important way to conduct technology assessments, inform policy makers about public views of new technologies, and improve public understanding of and participation in technological decision making. The first citizens’ panel in the United States occurred in April 1997 on the issue of “Telecommunications and the Future of Democracy.” This article evaluates the (...) impact of this citizens’ panel. The standard criteria to evaluate the impact of analyses focus on the “actual impact” and on the “impact on general thinking.” To these standard criteria, this article introduces the evaluation of two impacts related to learning: impact on the training of knowledgeable personnel and the interaction with lay knowledge. The impact evaluation is based on a nearly comprehensive set of semistructured telephone interviews with the participants in the panel. (shrink)

The prospect of germ-line genetic engineering, the ability to engineer genetic changes that can be passed on to subsequent generations, raises a wide range of moral and public policy questions. One of the most provocative questions is, simply put: Are there moral reasons that can be articulated in general secular terms for accepting human nature as we find it? Or, at least in terms of general secular moral restraints, may we reshape human nature better to meet our own interests, as (...) we define them? This question in turn raises the further question of whether human nature as it now exists has a moral standing akin to sacredness that can be understood in nonreligious terms. This essay will take as a given that it is not possible to show in general secular moral terms that human nature has a sanctity or special moral standing that should guide secular health-care policy. In addition, as this essay shows, it is not possible through appeals to considerations of authorizing consent or beneficence toward others to remedy this failure to establish a sanctity or special moral standing for human nature. Absent a religious or culturally normative understanding of human nature and given the availability of germline genetic engineering, there is a plurality of possibilities for refashioning our nature. The unavailability of substantive secular moral constraints on germ-line genetic engineering discloses a secularly licit plurality of possibilities for human nature. The likelihood that we will be able to refashion our human nature reveals how few general secular moral constraints there are to guide us. Paradoxically, the more we are able to reengineer our human nature, the less guidance is available. The plurality of possible conceptions of human well-being that can be pursued through germ-line genetic engineering challenges our self-understanding as humans. Given human freedom, and in the absence of taken-for-granted religious or cultural moral constraints, the likelihood of germ-line genetic engineering opens the possibility of human nature in the plural. (shrink)

Through criticism and analysis of ancient traditions, Kahn reconstructs the pattern of Anaximander’s thought using historical methods akin to the reconstructive techniques of comparative linguists.

The exemplary value of individual moral and political acts provides a unique vantage point for inquiring into the role of the creative imagination in social life. Drawing on Kant’s concept of productive imagination, I argue that an act’s exemplification of a fitting response to a moral or political problem or crisis is comparable to the way that a work of art expresses the ‘thought’ or ‘idea’ to which it gives voice. The exercise of practical reason, or phronesis, is akin to (...) the way that a work augments the practical field of our experiences in this respect. For, like a work of art, the act produces the rule to be followed by means of the example that it sets. Accordingly, I explain how the injunction issuing from the act can be credited to the way that the singular case summons its rule. The singular character of the injunction issuing from the act thus brings to the fore the relation between reflective judgment and this injunction’s normative value. The conjunction of reason, action, and the creative power of imagination offers a critical point of access for interrogating the normative force of claims rooted in individual acts. By setting reason, action, and imagination in the same conceptual framework, I therefore highlight the creative imagination’s subversive role in countering hegemonic systems and habits of thought through promoting the causes of social and political struggles. (shrink)

I. Since the beginnings of philosophy, in all cultures which have produced any, religion and philosophy have been closely tied up together, and have often been uneasy yoke-fellows, each at times feeling it a duty to combat the other. I think there are two main reasons for this, All higher religions develop a theology, or systematic statement of doctrine; the philosopher tends to regard this as a spurious kind of philosophy or science that deliberately neglects inconvenient facts; while the theologian (...) in his turn suspects the philosopher of ignoring important data which he ought to consider, viz.: the phenomena of concrete religion, Akin to this is the tendency of both parties to use the word “God” in a different sense; Pascal’s objection that the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is not the God of the philosophers is prima facie justified. Nevertheless both parties might have a claim to use the word. (shrink)

On some occasions of self-reference there can be two equally viable forms available to speakers: individual self-reference and collective self-reference. This means that selection of one or the other in talk-in-interaction can — akin to the selection of terms for reference to non-present persons — be guided by such considerations as recipient design and action formation. As a strategy for investigating the selection of self-reference terms, this article examines repairs to self-reference that change the form of reference from individual to (...) collective and vice versa. We first identify two repair operations found in the domain of self-reference: aggregation and extraction and then we track the use of both operations across a range of positions in the repair initiation opportunity space. Finally we consider some of the interactional uses of aggregation and extraction repairs in resolving sources of troubles associated with speaker epistemic authority and responsibility for described actions. (shrink)

Philosophical interest in the biological concept of function stems largely from concerns about its teleological associations. Assigning something a function seems akin to assigning it a purpose, and discussion of the purpose of items has long been off-limits to science. Analytic philosophers have attempted to defend ‘function’ by showing that claims about functions do not involve any reference to a problematic notion of purpose. To do this, philosophers offer short lists of necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the (...) concept—where the conditions involve only acceptable physical or biological notions—and claim that the set of conditions captures the import of function statements. (shrink)

I. It has long been a standing puzzle why the women at the festival of Mater Matuta prayed, not for their own children, but for their sisters' offspring. The attempts to connect it with any sociological phenomenon are purely absurd, and would not have been noticed but for their association with one or two famous names and the complete ignorance of non-European systems of relationship prevailing among the scholars of an older generation. There is no system under which a woman (...) is closer akin to her sister's children than to her own; for under father-right a nephew or niece is further off than an own child, and if the system be pushed to the most logical and most absurd extremity, so as to make a child kin to his father only, not his mother, then he is also no kin to his mother's sister; under mother-right, which Rome never had in any form whatsoever, the mother is still nearer kin than the maternal aunt; while if ever there was, anywhere in the world, a classificatory system so pure and rigorous as to make no distinction between the actual mother and any other woman of the same age-class, then mother and aunt were in the same degree of kinship to every member of the younger generation. No ritual explanation I know will bear investigating. Yet the fact is handed down to us on good authority, probably that of Verrius Flaccus, the most likely common source for Ovid and Plutarch. (shrink)

A functional interpretation of facial expressions of pain is welcome. Facial expressions of pain may be useful not only for communication, such as inviting help. They may also be of direct use, as parts of writhing pain behavior patterns, serving to get rid of pain stimuli and/or to suppress pain sensations by something akin to hyperstimulation analgesia.

The objective of the new series, "Molecular Biology, Biochemistry and Biophysics", of which this brochure forms the first volume, is to produce more than another compilation of data. It is hoped that the new series will help the individual "specialist" keep abreast of important developments in the natural sciences at the molecular and subcellular level in fields complementary to his own. The predominant aim is not so much to increase the ever-growing body of information in an encyclopedic fashion but rather (...) to give, in addition to a well rounded factual presentation of subjects which have reached a degree of maturation, a leitmotiv developed by the individual authors from a more personal point of view. The reader should thus be able to use these mono graphs not only for acquisition of knowledge but as a source of further motiva tion in his own work. This latter and more consequential aim of the monograph series is one of the reasons for presenting here a most unusual talk which should enable the reader to sit back and view his own efforts in the context of science and creative attempts as a whole. The lecture is the virtually unknown inaugural address of the Dutch physical chemist JACOBUS HENRICUS VAN'T HOFF. As is shown in his short biography presented on pages 3 and 4 the principal thoughts of the molecular biologist of today are akin to his own and he clearly recognized the universality of molecular life processes. (shrink)

A paradox of self-reference in beliefs in games is identified, which yields a game-theoretic impossibility theorem akin to Russell’s Paradox. An informal version of the paradox is that the following configuration of beliefs is impossible:Ann believes that Bob assumes that.

Though we cherish freedom and equality, there are human relations we commonly take to be morally permissible despite the fact that they essentially involve an inequality specifically of freedom, i.e., parental and fiduciary relations. In this article, I argue that the morality of these relations is best understood through a very old and dangerous concept, the concept of status. Despite their historic and continuing abuses, status relations are alive and well today, I argue, because some of them are necessary. We (...) must therefore carefully specify the conditions in which such status relations may morally obtain, as well as the duties of virtue and duties of right to which all parties are subject when it does (including a duty of care) to clearly articulate the ways in which these putatively moral status relations that essentially involve an asymmetry of autonomy (status relations) can go well or badly even within the context of the Kantian tradition from which our current legal and social practices arose. To this end, I offer Kant's own concept of status as a promising one because in Kant's theory, status is a nexus of virtue and right that is reducible to neither property nor contract but akin to each in familiar ways. Once status is admitted as an alternative to property and contract, status may be extended beyond Kant's domestic paradigm, most perspicuously to institutional ethics. In this article, I sketch a status-based theory of stakeholding that locates environmental impact, institutional oppression, and other significant features of our moral landscape within a Kantian framework of duties rich enough to more accurately characterize the complexities of stakeholding than current tradition has allowed. (shrink)

Recent students of late medieval intellectual history have treated Oxford theologians' Sentences lectures from the 1320s to 1330s as revealing the interface of the theological, logical, and scientific thinking characteristic of a historically momentous ‘New English Theology’. Its conceptual achievement, historians generally concur, was the casting off of the speculative metaphysics of such thirteenth-century authors as Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon; its methodological novelty made it akin to twentieth-century analytic philosophy and seminal for the early Scientific Revolution. Yet the metaphysically (...) cast thirteenth-century sciences of perspectiva and astrologia persisted among scholars long into the early modern period. To show how this apparent paradox may be dissolved, this article details the intersection of thirteenth-century metaphysics and fourteenth-century analysis in the lectures of a controversial and influential proponent of the Oxford theology of the 1330s. (shrink)

How human beings came to exist in this physical world is a question that has preoccupied mankind for as long as history records; every religion offers an answer, and so too have philosophers of natural history from Aristotle and before. The year 2009 will see celebrations of the 200th anniversary of the birth of Charles Darwin, progenitor of the theory - or fact, as its adherents see it - that gives the secular scientific world the "creation story" dominant today. Social (...) status in every society flows to the people who persuade the mass that they offer the true and accurate explanation of how we humans came to be; but the social and financial benefits that flow to the "truth pronouncers" of society produce sociological and psychological motivations that bias and impair the independent logical assessment of whether the data supports, or contradicts, the story whose wide acceptance produces so many tangible benefits. The discoveries of molecular biology and DNA over the years since 1950 raise, in the minds of a dissident minority of scientists, substantial possibilities that the theory of evolution cannot be considered complete without the operation of some force or element in the material world that we can only conceive of as being akin to the intelligence with which we ourselves address the world. In this paper, the author, holder of an MIT bachelor of science (in architecture) and the latest in a family of seven generations of physicians, scientists, and engineers, from the 1700s to the 2000s, relates lessons learned not only about evolution, molecular biology, and "intelligent design," but also about the accumulated "bad habits" that have developed and encrusted the conduct of science in the 130 years since the foundation of the research-oriented universities in the 1870s. (shrink)

Since the first volume appeared in 2005, the collection Controversies has brought together pieces of work related to the field of argumentation, giving particular attention to those that are concerned with theoretical and practical problems connected with discursive controversy and confrontation. Authors such as P. Barrotta, M. Dascal, S. Frogel, H. Chang and D. Walton had already either edited or written previous editions to the present volume (volume six) of the collection. F. H. van Eemeren and B. Garssen (the former (...) has already, with P. Houtlosser, edited the second volume of this collection) are responsible for compiling and editing this collection. In this volume Van Eemeren and Garssen edit works they conceive as being akin to those elements which, in argumentation discourse, serve to resolve – or often to present – differences of opinion. However, it should be added that this is not a mere editing job, but rather the result of an intellectual collaboration between two international research groups dedicated to a common field – consisting, on the one hand, of controversies and, on the other, of argumentation. (shrink)

While many philosophers of science have accorded special evidential significance to tests whose results are "novel facts", there continues to be disagreement over both the definition of novelty and why it should matter. The view of novelty favored by Giere, Lakatos, Worrall and many others is that of use-novelty: An accordance between evidence e and hypothesis h provides a genuine test of h only if e is not used in h's construction. I argue that what lies behind the intuition that (...) novelty matters is the deeper intuition that severe tests matter. I set out a criterion of severity akin to the notion of a test's power in Neyman-Pearson statistics. I argue that tests which are use-novel may fail to be severe, and tests that are severe may fail to be use-novel. I discuss the 1919 eclipse data as a severe test of Einstein's law of gravity. (shrink)

This paper examines truth diagrams for some non-classical, modal and dynamic logics. Truth diagrams are diagrammatic and visual ways to represent logical truth akin to truth tables, developed by Peter C.-H. Cheng. Currently, it is only given for classical propositional logic. In this paper, we establish truth diagrams for Priest's Logic of Paradox, Belnap–Dunn's Four-Valued Logic, MacColl's Connexive Logic, Bochvar–Halldén's Logic of Non-Sense, Carnielli–Coniglio's logic of formal inconsistency as well as classical modal logic and its dynamic extension to shed light (...) on the semantic behaviour of some non-classical and modal logics. (shrink)

This paper is about how the horror of noise has been expressed in the work of some writers, fiction and theory, who have detected a certain alien weirdness lurking in the human voice. I link this to Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of ‘becoming-animal’, in which a ‘strange ecology’ is described. ‘We sorcerors’, they say, are drawn to experimental alliances with nature. The ‘sorceror’ is admitted to a multitudinous, teeming space and opened up to the immanent alien. H. P. Lovecraft’s weird (...) fiction frequently deals with alien simulacra of human language and speech. This is speech as human-alien alliance. In Thomas Ligotti’s fiction, too, we find becoming articulated as speech-noise. Apocalypse is imagined as ecstatic choral annihilation in which all souls merge into a great ‘black unity’. For Ligotti, we are the suffering puppets of a Schopenhauerian Will akin to Lovecraft’s ‘blind idiot god’, Azathoth. Nevertheless, what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘becoming zero’ can be associated with an affirmative thought of noise ontology, a furore which is sounded more from Bataille's 'Mouth' than from Azathoth’s mad musicians. As the head is thrown back in joyful frenzy, the mouth opens, screams ejaculate and rend with nature’s explosive propagation, like a blossoming flower or the racket of an anus. (shrink)

This paper examines truth diagrams for some non-classical, modal and dynamic logics. Truth diagrams are diagrammatic and visual ways to represent logical truth akin to truth tables, developed by Peter C.-H. Cheng. Currently, it is only given for classical propositional logic. In this paper, we establish truth diagrams for Priest's Logic of Paradox, Belnap–Dunn's Four-Valued Logic, MacColl's Connexive Logic, Bochvar–Halldén's Logic of Non-Sense, Carnielli–Coniglio's logic of formal inconsistency as well as classical modal logic and its dynamic extension to shed light (...) on the semantic behaviour of some non-classical and modal logics. (shrink)

This paper examines truth diagrams for some non-classical, modal and dynamic logics. Truth diagrams are diagrammatic and visual ways to represent logical truth akin to truth tables, developed by Peter C.-H. Cheng. Currently, it is only given for classical propositional logic. In this paper, we establish truth diagrams for Priest's Logic of Paradox, Belnap–Dunn's Four-Valued Logic, MacColl's Connexive Logic, Bochvar–Halldén's Logic of Non-Sense, Carnielli–Coniglio's logic of formal inconsistency as well as classical modal logic and its dynamic extension to shed light (...) on the semantic behaviour of some non-classical and modal logics. (shrink)

In a recent study of a patient in a persistent vegetative state, [Owen, A. M., Coleman, M. R., Boly, M., Davis, M. H., Laureys, S., & Pickard, J. D. . Detecting awareness in the vegetative state. Science, 313, 1402] claimed that they had demonstrated the presence of consciousness in this patient. This bold conclusion was based on the isomorphy between brain activity in this patient and a set of conscious control subjects, obtained in various imagery tasks. However, establishing consciousness in (...) unresponsive patients is fraught with methodological and conceptual difficulties. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the current debate surrounding consciousness in VS patients has parallels in the artificial intelligence debate as to whether machines can think. Basically, used a method analogous to the Turing test to reveal the presence of consciousness, whereas their adversaries adopted a line of reasoning akin to Searle’s Chinese room argument. Highlighting the correspondence between these two debates can help to clarify the issues surrounding consciousness in non-communicative agents. (shrink)

I show that Wittgenstein's critique of G.H. Hardy's mathematical realism naturally extends to Paul Benacerraf's influential paper, ‘Mathematical Truth’. Wittgenstein accuses Hardy of hastily analogizing mathematical and empirical propositions, thus leading to a picture of mathematical reality that is somehow akin to empirical reality despite the many puzzles this creates. Since Benacerraf relies on that very same analogy to raise problems about mathematical ‘truth’ and the alleged ‘reality’ to which it corresponds, his major argument falls prey to the same critique. (...) The problematic pictures of mathematical reality suggested by Hardy and Benacerraf can be avoided, according to Wittgenstein, by disrupting the analogy that gives rise to them. I show why Tarskian updates to our conception of ‘truth’ discussed by Benacerraf do not answer Wittgenstein's concerns. That is, because they merely presuppose what Wittgenstein puts into question, namely, the essential uniformity of ‘truth’ and ‘proposition’ in ordinary discourse. (shrink)

My thesis is that you can lie with ‘ P therefore Q ’ without P or Q being lies. For you can lie by virtue of not believing that P supports Q. My thesis is reconciled with the principle that all lies are assertions through H. P. Grice’s account of conventional implicatures. These semantic cousins of conversational implicatures are secondary assertions that clarify the speaker’s attitude toward his primary assertions. The meaning of ‘therefore’ commits the speaker to an entailment thesis (...) even though the speaker does not enter that commitment into the text. Insincere conventional implicatures are akin to insincerely asserted footnotes. An absence of lies in the text is compatible with the presence of lies in the meta-text. (shrink)

Charles McCoy’s Christian theology and ethics are based in a covenantal understanding that provides a way for Christians to engage the many views in the modern university. McCoy’s approach has both openness and commitment; it is akin to and supported by the fiduciary thought of Johannes Cocceius, H. R. Niebuhr, and Michael Polanyi. By seeing the way faith as trust operates in human beings, McCoy has laid foundations for Christian theology in a muticultural and pluralistic age. Most important is McCoy’s (...) argument that there are many theologies, even Christian theologies, and the life of Chrisitian faith is always one of growth and of exploration. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant’s Idealism by Philip J. NeujahrYolanda EstesPhilip J. Neujahr. Kant’s Idealism. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995. Pp. viii + 134. Paper, $16.00.In Kant’s Idealism, Philip Neujahr contends that the Critique of Pure Reason expresses no distinctively “transcendental” form of idealism. Neujahr disagrees with commentators, such as H. J. Paton and Henry Allison, who attempt to show that the Kantian project is in essence a coherent and tenable (...) one. He agrees with commentators, such as Norman Kemp Smith and P. F. Strawson, who argue that the various facets of Kant’s philosophy do not constitute a coherent whole. Moreover, he suggests that the tensions in Kant’s philosophy betray more serious, deep-rooted contradictions than have been previously imagined by the least generous interpreters.Neujahr maintains Kant’s theoretical philosophy contains disparate threads of idealism, which remain closely tied to the idealistic tradition preceding it, but which present no single idealist doctrine, because Kant provided neither a unified account of the nature of the cognitive subject nor a single theory of the subject’s relation to the object of knowledge. The description of the cognitive subject given in the Critique permits several readings. One might assume that the cognitive subject represents the individual human being. According to Neujahr, this interpretation yields a monadistic view of the subject, similar to Leibniz’s, which allows for no interaction between individual minds within a public, spatio-temporal world. Alternatively, one might imagine a universal mind, something akin to Berkeley’s God or Hegel’s Spirit, which is not equivalent to the individual human subject. This interpretation avoids some complications associated with the first view, but it makes it difficult to specify the relation between the cosmic mind and the phenomenal individual or to account for our a priori knowledge of the subjective contribution to experience.Unresolved tensions between the doctrines of sensibility and understanding generate ambiguities in Kant’s overall account of consciousness, including his explanation of the status of the subject and object of experience. Neujahr suggests that the Transcendental Aesthetic presupposes a “correspondence” theory of consciousness, whereas the Transcendental Deduction contains a “coherence” theory of consciousness. According to Neujahr’s interpretation of the doctrine of sensibility, consciousness involves a relation between an ontologically distinct subject and object. On this reading, the status of the object seems ambiguous, and thus the phenomenal world remains in some sense “unreal” in contrast to the thing in itself. Neujahr believes the doctrine of understanding avoids these difficulties by eliminating the thing in itself and redefining “reality” in [End Page 143] terms of those features about the world that make it knowable, but he doubts the possibility of reconciling this approach with the Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant’s distinction between the empirical and transcendental points of view is often seen as a way of entering and understanding his philosophy, but Neujahr argues that Kant’s use of this terminology is itself inconsistent and unhelpful without a thoroughgoing revision.Neujahr contends that Kant attempts to discover the conditions necessary for knowledge, but that he locates the source of these epistemic conditions within the mind and that this “psychologizing” tendency has important ontological implications. Neujahr considers the possibility of salvaging Kant’s philosophy by attempts, such as Allison’s, to give sympathetic epistemological interpretations of transcendental idealism or by efforts, such as Strawson’s, to excise the idealism from the critical philosophy, but he denies that these endeavors can save transcendental idealism without violating the letter of Kant’s philosophy. Moreover, he contends that Kant’s idealism remains vulnerable to skepticism in asmuch as it fails to answer Hume’s doubts about the unity of consciousness and Descartes’s questions about the existence of the external world.Neujahr’s unsympathetic reading of Kant’s theoretical philosophy may appear unduly harsh to many readers. Many readers will wish for some acknowledgment that the second Critique and the third Critique might mitigate some of the inconsistencies delineated by Neujahr, who provides little elucidation of the first Critique through any texts other than the Inaugural Dissertation and the Prolegomena. Nonetheless, Kant’s Idealism grapples with complex issues in the first Critique and suggests a... (shrink)

The object of this article is to examine, with the work of Jeremy Bentham as the principal example, one strand in the complex pattern of European social theory during the second half of the eighteenth century. This was of course the period not only of the American and French revolutions, but of the culmination of the movements of thought constituting what we know as the Enlightenment. Like all great historical episodes, the Enlightenment was both the fulfilment of long-established processes and (...) the inauguration of new processes of which the fulfilment lay in the future. Thus the seminal ideas of seventeenth-century rationalism realized and perhaps exhausted their potentialities in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The ideas with which this article is concerned, however—conveniently grouped and labelled as the ideas of utilitarianism—only began to achieve systematic development in these later decades of the eighteenth century. Within that period—during the first half and more of Bentham's long life—attempts to apply those ideas to the solution of social problems met largely with failure and frustration. Yet unrealized potentialities remained, the realization of which was reserved for a time when the world of the philosophes no longer existed. The movements for social and political reform which have played so large a part in modern history since the French Revolution may be judged in widely differing ways; but whatever the verdict, these movements surely cannot be understood without due consideration of that part of their origins which lies in eighteenth-century utilitarianism. (shrink)

The relation between quantum measurement and thermodynamically irreversible processes is investigated. The reduction of the state vector is fundamentally asymmetric in time and shows an observer-relatedness which may explain the double interpretation of the state vector as a representation of physical states as well as ofinformation about physical states. The concept of relevance being used in all statistical theories of irreversible thermodynamics is demonstrated to be based on the same observer-relatedness. Quantum theories of irreversible processes implicitly use an objectivized process (...) of state vector reduction. The conditions for the reduction are discussed, and it is concluded that the final (subjective) observer system may be carried by a space point. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Purpose of Hegel's System FRITHJOF H. BERGMANN THIS ESSAYIS MEANTtO answer the question: what was Hegel really trying to do; what was the program that his system attempted to execute; what was the general enterprise that his philosophy sought to perform? Two things are clear: (1) Hegel insisted that philosophy had to be systematic. He ridiculed philosophers who made disconnected assertions and accused them of "shallowness" and of (...) "inspirationalism." The systematic exposition of philosophy was for Hegel synonymous with doing philosophy scientifically. If a proposition was not presented in the context of a philosophic system, it could not be more than a bald and unsupported assertion that did not merit serious philosophical consideration? (2) Hegel claimed that his own system demonstrated the "necessity" of its contents. The majority of the German Hegel scholars, Haym, Haering, Fischer, Rosenzweig, and Glockner, for example, never attempted to arrive at a precise explication of the function of Hegel's system or of his concept of necessity. They were interested in altogether different questions. The Englishspeaking scholars are generally agreed that by "necessity" Hegel meant "deductive certainty" or something very akin to it and that his system was therefore intended to demonstrate the indubitability, the certainty, or the a priority, of the propositions it contains. The deductions of Hegel's system were, according to them, designed to guarantee the factual truth of the statements derived. The general function of the system was to eliminate doubt. Stace, for example, defends this interpretation in his well-known book The Philosophy of Hegel. 2 In fact, he regards this claim to deductive certainty as the "cardinal claim" of Hegel's philosophy and extends it furthermore beyond the limits of Hegel's system so that, according to him, every possible true proposition can be established with logical necessity. Stace says: If we could discover a first principle, and could prove that it followed by logical necessity from that first principle that there must be a world and that it must be just the sort of world it is, then we should have an explanation.... Thus a philosophy which would genuinely explain the world will take as its first principle not a cause but a reason. From this first reason it will proceed to deduce the world, not as an effect, but as a logical consequent. We shall then see not merely that things are as they are, but we shall see why xCf. Preface to the Phenomenology. W. T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1955). [189] 190 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY they are as they are. This is the fundamental Hegelian idea of explanation. This is what tIegel's philosophy attempts to do? Later in the book Stace examines the "extraordinary position" which Hegel "takes up" on the question of the "contingency of nature." Hegel, as Stace points out, believed that particular facts and things cannot be deduced, that the "details of nature.., are governed by contingency and caprice." This position, according to Stace, "will not bear examination." Stace ascribes to tIegel the premise that "there is in this stone, or this man, nothing but thought, nothing but universals," and it, in Stace's opinion, implies that everything can be deduced. "If we are to have an idealistic monism it must explain everything from its single first principle, thought. And that means that it must deduce everything. To leave anything outside the network of deduction, to declare anything utterly undeducible, is simply dualism." * To answer this interpretation thoroughly, the character and purpose of Hegel's system has to be explained. This we shall attempt in the remainder of this essay. But three points can be made in a preliminary way: 1) Is the position which Hegel did not hold, but which he should have held, according to Stace, any more tenable than the position which Stace rejects as inconsistent? Is it really conceivable that every last fact concerning tile universe--including the number of hairs on Hegel's head--could be "logically deduced" from a first principle? 2) Did Hegel really accept the premise which in Stace's opinion implies that every fact must be deducible? This would certainly be important, since Ilegel... (shrink)

Methoden. Im obigen Artikel ist die „Phylogenie des Stammbaumes” untersucht worden. Beginnend mitHaeckel werden 26 Typen phylogenetischer Symbole kritisch besprochen, d.h. nicht die Resultate, sondern nur die Methoden, z.B. bezüglich Systematik und Phylogenie, lebender und ausgestorbener Organismen, geologischer Perioden, Stufen und homologer Variationen, geographischer Verbreitung, Diversität, etwaiger Bedeutung der Einzelheiten, Mono-, Bi- und Polyrheithrie , usw. Der Faktor Zeit wird dabei für phylogenetische Systeme als der wesentlichste betrachtet. Der Autor hat daher in seinen- neuen Darstellungen die Begriffe „Zeit-Stufen” oder „Zeit-Globen-Oberflächen” (...) eingeführt; diese stehen senkrecht zum „Zeit-Radius”. Auf diesem Grunde wird ein neues Kriterium zur Unterscheidung systematischer und phylogenetischer Vorstellungen denjenigen anderer Autoren hinzugefügt. Erläuterungen. Nach einer Übersicht über die besprochenen Schemen im 1. Teil werden die Verhältnisse zwischen systematischen und phylogenetischen Darstellungen sowie die Verbindung ihrer Symbole untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass viele Einzelheiten solcher Konstruktionen oft, wissentlich oder unwissentlich, keine bestimmte Bedeutung haben. Der Verfasser hat versucht zu zeigen, dass es erwünscht wäre, möglichst mit allen Einzelheiten einer symbolischen Darstellung irgendeine Bedeutung zu verbinden: Linien und Entfernungen in der Ebene, Winkel in räumlichen Schemen. Die letztgenannten werden besonders für solche Arten von phylogenetischen Systemen empfohlen, bei denen der Faktor Zeit stets eine der Dimensionen bildet. Dieser Grundsatz wird mit der Evolution systematischer Einzelheiten in Verbindung gebracht, und Merkmals-Phyletik, homologe Variationen, Stufen, Polyrheithrie, Analogie und Homologie, Konvergenz und Verwandtschaft, etc. werden kurz im Lichte der Vererbungslehre besprochen. Es istHayata's extrem dynamischen Ansichten zu verdanken, dass das Statische in den systematischen und phylogenetischen Darstellungen aufgelockert worden ist. Méthodes. Dans l'article inséré ci-dessus il s'agit de ce qu'on pourrait appeler „la phylogénie de l'arbre généalogique”. En commençant parHaeckel , l'auteur discute 26 types divers de symboles phylogénétiques, c.à.d. seulement les méthodes , par exemple en ce qui concerne la taxonomie et la phylogénie, les organismes récents et éteints, les périodes géologiques, les niveaux et les variations homologues, la distribution géographique, la diversité, la signification éventuelle des détails, la mono-, bi- et polyrheithrie , etc. Le Temps est considéré comme l'élément le plus essentiel dans tout système phylogénétique. Par conséquence, l'auteur a introduit dans ses nouvelles représentations les idées de „Niveaux” ou de „Surfaces des Sphères du Temps” qui sont imaginés perpendiculaires au Radius-Temps. Dans l'ordre de ces idées un nouveau critère est ajouté à ceux donnés par d'autres auteurs pour la distinction des systèmes taxonomiques et des représentations phylogénétiques. Justifications. Après une récapitulation des systèmes, énumérés dans la première partie, les relations des constructions taxonomiques et phylogénétiques, ainsi que les connections de leurs symboles sont discutées. Souvent plusieurs détails sont, sciemment ou insciemment, dépourvus de toutes signification. L'auteur a essayé de démontrer qu'il serait désirable d'attribuer autant que possible de significations définies au détails d'une représentation symbolique de la nature décrite: aux lignes et aux distances dans le plan, aux angles dans l'espace. Les constructions tridimensionales sont particulièrement recommandées pour plusieurs systèmes phylogénétiques; dans de tels systèmes le Temps devrait toujours remplir la fonction d'une des dimensions. Ce principe est mis en rapport avec l'évolution des unités taxonomiques; phylogénie des charactères, variations homologues, niveaux, polyrheithrie, analogie et homologie, convergence et relations héréditaires, tous ces sujets sont brièvement discutés dans leurs rapports avec la Génétique. Selon l'opinion de l'auteur, c'est aux idées ultra-dynamiques d'Hayata que la taxonomie et la phylogénie doivent la pénétration féconde du dynamisme dans leurs systèmes trop souvent statiques. (shrink)

Simone Weil was a remarkable woman: a teacher, a factory worker, a field hand, a traveler, and a frontline volunteer in the Spanish Civil War; yet she found time to write and to philosophize about life and religion. Her short life (1909–43) spanned two world wars, al­though she did not live to see the end of the second one. The reac­tions of this French Jewish woman to some of the facets of these conflicts may seem surprising; her sympathies and affirmations (...) were perhaps too extreme, but she did think for herself in an un­orthodox and challenging way and had a passionate sense of justice. Mr. Rees believes that this book may contain more illumina­tion for the present world’s spiritual needs than any other twentieth-­century commentary. Some of Simone Weil’s proposals concerning patriotism, obligations, freedom of expression, and the needs of the soul may seem Utopian, but they would not be unreasonable in a society adopting her moral code. Simone Weil was an intellectual with an essentially tragic view of life, but she was not removed from the everyday life. Her thought was unique and cannot be classified. She was neither a re­actionary nor a progressive but a great soul and a brilliant mind, as T. S. Eliot expressed it, “with a kind of genius akin to that of the saints.” Since she explored problems which confront modern man, the reader will find thoughtful stimulation in her work. In a previ­ous book, Brave Men, the author likened her to D. H. Lawrence—both lonely visionaries suffering from a devouring spiritual hunger. This book gives a condensed but penetrating account of Miss Weil’s interests. Since her writings cover more than philosophy and religion, the reader will feel compelled to become more familiar with her work. (shrink)

Cultural boundaries in Islam based on Hadith (Islamic traditions).

Study of Islamic philosophy of Yaḥyá ibn Ḥabash Suhrawardī, 1152 or 1153-1191.

H. S. Eveling; XII—Some Patterns of Justification in Ethics, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 66, Issue 1, 1 June 1966, Pages 149–166, https://do.

SUFFERING HUMAN AND DIVINE INTRODUCTION I KNEW when I asked Dr. H. Wheeler Robinson to write this volume on Suffering that I was giving him the most difficult ...